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The Proposed Repeal of the Financial
Interest and Syndication Rules:
Network Domination or Public
Interest Representation?
by EVIE L. KINTZER*
I
Introduction
One of the most important issues facing the television broad-
casting industry today is the Federal Communications Com-
mission's (FCC) proposed repeal of the Financial Interest and
Syndication Rules (FISR),' which were enacted in 1970 after
years of discussion among the FCC, the three national televi-
sion broadcast networks and Hollywood's major studios and
independent production companies. At the heart of the contro-
versy concerning the Commission's rules regarding the finan-
cial interest and syndication rights held by the networks is the
FCC public mandate set forth in the Communications Act of
1934.2
The data produced before the FCC in its investigation of net-
work television broadcasting from 1960 through 1970 indicated
an unhealthy situation, and the Commission in 1970 declared
that "[t] he public interest required limitation on network con-
trol and an increase in the opportunity for development of
* B.A., Brandeis University, 1979; J.D., Hastings College of the Law; In-house
Counsel, Computer Curriculum Corporation; Member California Bar. The author
wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Professor John L. Diamond, Has-
tings College of the Law, and the editorial assistance of Ms. Alison Datz.
1. Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FISR].
2. Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in 47
U.S.C. §§ 157-757 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited as Communications Act].
Title 47, § 303 of the United States Code, "Powers and Duties of Commission," reads:
"the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires, shall-. . . (g) . . .generally encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest; .. . (r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter .... " 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976) (emphasis added).
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truly independent sources of prime time programming. Ex-
isting practices and structure combined have centralized con-
trol and virtually eliminated needed sources of mass appeal
programs competitive with network offerings in prime time."3
To remedy the situation, the FCC decided to establish the
Prime Time Access Rule (PTAR),4 which opened
access directly to the top 50 markets for independent program-
ing by prohibiting network affiliates in these markets ... from
taking more than 3 hours of network programs between 7 p.m.
and 11 p.m.. . . [In effect] the rule ... will open up 1/2 hour of
additional time per evening for non network programs on affili-
ated stations. Off-network programs may not be inserted...
[since] this would destroy the essential purpose of the rule to
open the market to first run syndicated programs.5
The PTAR was adopted by the FCC in its Report and Order
on May 4, 1970.6 This action on the part of the FCC was be-
lieved to provide a "healthy impetus to the development of in-
dependent program sources. ' 7 By opening the market, the
FCC believed it would bring a greater supply of programs to
independent stations, as well as a greater diversity of program
ideas to the viewing public.8
Our objective is to provide opportunity-now lacking in televi-
sion-for the competitive development of alternate sources of
television programs ....
We believe that substantial benefit to the public interest in
television broadcast service will flow from opening up evening
time so that producers may have the opportunity to develop
their full economic and creative potential under better compet-
itive conditions than are now available to them.9
To strengthen its objective of expanding competitive oppor-
tunity in television program production, the FCC adopted rules
to exclude the networks from distribution and profit sharing in
domestic syndication. ° The financial interest rule prohibits
3. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Re-
port and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, para. 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order].
4. For further discussion of the Prime Time Access Rule (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658(k) (1982)), see generally Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d at 382.
5. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 22.
6. See supra note 4.
7. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 23.
8. Id.
9. Id. at paras. 25-26 (emphasis added).
10. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1982).
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the networks from having any financial interest in programs
they have not themselves produced. The syndication rule pro-
hibits the networks from operating as syndicators or from
sharing in the profits from distribution by others in the domes-
tic syndication market. This alleviates any inducement on the
part of the network to choose for network exhibition only those
programs in which it had acquired rights. Producers would
then become more competitive as the syndication market ex-
panded to become a feasible alternative to network exhibition.
Ultimately, the independent producers would gain in strength
and be able to compete effectively for network time.1'
The FCC believed that the rules adopted served the public
interest. Without defining the public interest, it noted that
"[dliversity of programs and development of diverse and an-
tagonistic sources of program service are essential to the
broadcast licensee's discharge of his duty as 'trustee' for the
public in the operation of his channel."' 2
Much controversy has surrounded the FISR since their in-
ception. The issues at the center of the controversy are three-
fold. First, does the Communications Act of 1934, by its terms,
give the FCC the power to regulate the contractual relations
between the independent television stations and the television
broadcast networks and/or to control the complex operations
of these national networks? 3 Second, what does the phrase in
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity"'14 mean and
how is the FCC to determine its boundaries? Third, is the pub-
lic interest best served by the abolition, amendment or com-
plete retention of the rules at issue?
This article discusses the following issues: (1) the FCC's
power to regulate the complex dealings surrounding network
television, (2) the background of the Prime Time Access Rule
and the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, established
in the public interest, and (3) the compelling public interest in
retaining the existing rules. These complex issues can be ad-
dressed only after a careful examination of the background of
the rules and the television broadcast industry they regulate.
11. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 29.
12. Id. at para. 37.
13. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 228-229 (1943)
(Muphy, J., dissenting); Davidson, Extension of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's Jurisdiction to the Television Networks, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 235 (1982).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
No. 3]
COMM/ENT L. J.
This article also examines some of the major court cases con-
cerning these issues and briefly touches on the ramifications of
the consent decree reached in the civil antitrust action of
United States v. National Broadcasting Co."5
II
History
Even before the advent of television, the National Broadcast-
ing Company (NBC) challenged the regulatory power of the
FCC. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 6 the
Supreme Court determined that the Communications Act of
1934 "establishes that the Commission's [regulatory] powers
are not limited to the engineering and technical aspects of...
radio communication." 7 In particular, the court determined
that eight regulations concerning "chain broadcasting"' 8 and
the relations between licensed broadcast stations and network
organizations furnishing programs to such stations, were in-
deed within the powers Congress conferred upon the FCC.' 9
The FCC found that "at the end of 1938 there were 660 com-
mercial stations in the United States, and that 341 of these
were affiliated with national networks. 135 stations were affili-
ated exclusively with the National Broadcasting Company...
which operated two national networks .... "2o The FCC real-
ized that network broadcasting was important to the continued
development of radio, in that the result would be national cov-
erage of entertainment and cultural programs. 2' However, the
Commission discovered that the networks were placing con-
straints on the affiliated stations; for example, the networks
forced stations to accept many of the networks' shows, thereby
precluding any decisions by the local stations concerning their
communities' needs.22
Furthermore, the network contracts bound their affiliates for
a number of years, depriving "the public of the improved ser-
vice it might otherwise derive from competition in the network
15. 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
16. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
17. Id. at 215.
18. Chain broadcasting is the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program
by two or more connected stations." Id. at 194 n.l.
19. Id. at 224.
20. Id. at 197.
21. Id. at 198.
22. Id. at 199.
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field."23 The networks had complete control over the policies of
their affiliated stations. The FCC found that this control re-
strained the stations' freedom and operated against the public
interest. "It is the station, not the network, which is licensed to
serve the public interest."24 The Supreme Court determined
that "[t] he 'public interest' to be served under the Communi-
cations Act is thus the interest of the listening public in 'the
larger and more effective use of radio' § 303(g)."25
In examining the legislative history of the Communications
Act, the Supreme Court found the Act gave the FCC expansive
powers.26 Congress recognized that the communications field
was growing so rapidly that an itemized listing of the general
problems under the FCC mandate would frustrate the purpose
of the Act.27 The FCC claimed to be "issuing these [chain
broadcasting] regulations because [it] found that the network
practices prevent the maximum utilization of radio facilities in
the public interest. ' 28 The Supreme Court found that the regu-
lations were made pursuant to congressional authority, but
pointed out that "[i]f time and changing circumstances reveal
that the 'public interest' is not served by application of the
Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act
in accordance with its statutory obligations.
'29
These statutory obligations require the FCC to continually
reexamine the television industry 0 to determine if the FCC
regulations serve the public interest. The financial interest
and syndication rules emerged from a Commission inquiry be-
gun in 1959 with an Order for Investigatory Proceeding," when
the Commission instituted proceedings "to determine the poli-
23. Id. at 202.
24. Id. at 205.
25. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 219.
27. Id. The purpose of the Communications Act is to "secure the maximum bene-
fits of radio to all the people of the United States." Id. at 217.
28. Id. at 224.
29. Id. at 225. "[W]hen the networks transmit their signals from a network owned
station over leased connecting lines, and these signals are then relayed to the public
by other network owned stations and by affiliated licensees, both the networks and the
licensees are encompassed by the terms 'radio stations engaged in chain broadcast-
ing.'" Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 481 (2d Cir. 1971).
30. The Commission must serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"
according to 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
31. Order for Investigatory Proceeding in Docket No. 12782, FCC 59-166, 24 Fed.
Reg. 1605 (1959); Supplementary Order for Investigatory Proceeding, FCC 59-1136, 24
Fed. Reg. 9275 (1959).
No. 31
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cies and practices pursued by networks and others in the ac-
quisition, ownership, production, distribution, selection, sale
and licensing of programs for television exhibition, and the
reasons and necessity in the public interest for said policies
and practices."32 After public hearings were held, the FCC con-
cluded in part that "station responsibility, in practice, has be-
come a 'shared responsibility,' if not almost completely
'delegated' to the networks."33
The FCC, through its Notice of Proposed Rule Making ,3 in-
troduced rules which were:
intended to multiply competitive sources of television
programing by (1) eliminating networks from domestic syndi-
cation [network licenses program series to local independent
stations on a market-by-market basis] and from the foreign
syndication of independently (nonnetwork) produced pro-
grams; (2) prohibiting networks from acquiring additional
rights in programs independently produced and licensed for
network showing; and (3) limiting to approximately 50 percent
(with certain programs exempted) the amount of network
prime time programing in which networks could have interests
beyond the right to network exhibitions. The notice of
rulemaking sets forth in detail the conditions of increasing net-
work control of programs and subsidiary rights in programs
which led to its adoption.35
The FCC had two motives behind the proposed rules: "(1) to
restrain network domination of night time television, and
(2) to open access to the valuable prime time hours to in-
dependent producers. '"36
A. The Television Industry
In order to understand the issues under attack by the FCC,
one must understand something about the television industry.
Television is a business. While it may be only one of many
forms of entertainment, television is the most effective commu-
nications and advertising medium today. The networks have
32. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 473-74.
33. Id. at 474. See also OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, INTERIM REPORT OF OFFICE OF
NETWORK STUDY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR BROADCAST MATTER (1960), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 197, 225 (1963).
34. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules With Respect to Com-
petition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 45 F.C.C. 2146 (1965).
35. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 1.
36. Id. at para. 4.
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gradually dominated television since about 1947, 37 although
their role has been primarily that of middle agents. In this
role, the networks buy or lease programs from independent
producers or production companies, get advertisers to buy
commercial time, and then pay their nationwide affiliated sta-
tions to air these programs with the packaged advertising.38
While this may be a simplified version of the entire process, it
is clear the networks provide programs with an immediate con-
nection to national coverage, assuring a large viewing audience
and making advertising cost-effective.
If an independent producer were to market his program in-
dependently, he would have to travel throughout the country
selling the program to each station. These stations would then
have to find advertisers to buy commercial time on the pro-
gram. Advertising brings in less revenue in the local market
because the local audience is smaller than the national one
and fewer people will buy the products or use the services ad-
vertised. 9 In addition, the producer would find few affiliates to
purchase programs, because most stations' prime time hours
are taken up with network programming.'
The independent producer thus fears that he will make less
money if he sells his program independently, and is forced to
deal with the networks. The networks have great bargaining
strength in negotiations with the independent producers be-
cause they offer the independent producer a wider viewing au-
dience. This arrangement also satisfies the advertiser whose
commercials are aired nationally.
Numerous factors make this scenario more complex. Most
independent producers cannot afford to finance a pilot script,
let alone an entire series. 41 Often, the networks will help fi-
nance the program, but only in return for some creative control
and/or budget approval.' Unfortunately for the producer, the
price paid by the network rarely equals the total production
37. Id. at para. 11.
38. Id. at para. 14; Waz, The Public Interest in "Financial Interest", AcCESS, Dec.
1982, at 4; Amendment of Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Tentative Decision
and Request for Further Comments in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 83-377, 48 Fed. Reg.
38,020, at para. 4 (adopted Aug. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Decision and
Request].
39. Brown, Who's Afraid of Big Bad Cable?, AMERICAN FiLM, Sept. 1981, at 66.
40. Report and Order, supra note 3, at paras. 7-8.




costs and the producer falls under the control of the network,
which can easily provide financing for the production, and
which, through distribution of the program, can help the pro-
ducer recoup some of his/her losses.43
The independent producer is compelled to depend on the
network for financing in order to obtain national distribution.
Before the rules were adopted, independent producers were
practically forced to bargain away many of their rights in their
programs in order to secure their relationship with the net-
works.' First, a network would take a financial interest in the
production. In general, investments in productions not guaran-
teed to receive good ratings or make money were risky. Sec-
ond, the network would take a percentage of the money
brought in by the subsidiary uses of a program. While it would
be to the networks' benefit to air programs in which they had a
financial interest, this second interest assured them of recover-
ing their initial investment. Unfortunately, it was primarily
through subsidiary use of a program that producers could re-
cover their cost and make a profit.4" Independent producers
eager to enter the valuable prime time television market found
it necessary to transfer a "substantial part of the potential
profitability of their products to the purchasers-the net-
works"-in order to have their programs aired, or to make any
money at all.46
When a network leases a program from its producer, the net-
work pays the producer a license fee and acquires rights to air
the program for a period of time. The networks argue that
this arrangement is not sufficiently lucrative to cover the risk
of financing such programs, and also demand
some rights to share in the profits from the network run and
the right to distribute and/or share in the profits from ... do-
mestic syndication and overseas sales and other valuable sub-
sidiary rights. This type of arrangement facilitates network
control of the form, content, and creative aspects of the show
even though actual filming is done by a nominally independent
producer.48
Due to the disparity in bargaining power existing before the
43. Id. at para. 10.
44. Id.
45. Id. at paras. 10-12.
46. Id. at para. 10.
47. Tentative Decision and Request, s-upra note 38, at para. 4.
48. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 12.
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rules were enacted, the independent producer ended up with a
license fee for the lease of the program. The networks ended
up with a financial interest and a percentage of the syndication
rights of programs they helped finance and distribute. The re-
sult was that the networks controlled the syndication rights of
programs they neither had created nor developed.
The risk the networks take is not minor. The syndication
rights to which the independent producer and network may be
looking are worthless unless a series is aired for approximately
80-100 episodes, usually at least three years.49 At this time the
network has enough shows to package for independent off-net-
work run syndication. "The large number of episodes is re-
quired because the off-network syndicated series is usually
broadcast daily, in the same period, a practice known as strip-
ping.'' 50 The risk taken by the networks is compounded by the
fact that often they will not recover the high expense of pro-
duction and distribution.
From the hundreds of ideas received by the networks for
consideration for possible prime-time programming,
[e]ach free commercial television network may review as
many as 300 television series program 'ideas' in a year ....
From these proposals, hundred of scripts for television pilots
are ordered, such as the 700 pilot teleplays ordered by the three
networks for the 1980-81 television season. From these 700 se-
ries pilot scripts, 100 pilot programs were ordered, with the
other 600 scripts ending as financial losses .... [Alt the be-
ginning of 1980, over 200 projects were in active development
for the three television networks, with the hope that perhaps as
many as one-third would result in programming which could
be aired.5 '
For example, CBS had pilots made for thirty-two shows out of
the 155 scripts it had ordered for the 1982-1983 TV season.
From these thirty-two pilots, thirteen new prime time series
were created.52
Finally, notwithstanding all of the development time, effort,
and money spent on developing possible network television se-
ries, at least 75 percent of all new series are economic failures.
Given the highly competitive ratings races among the three
49. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 5.
50. Id.
51. 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAw, 2-25 to 2-26 (1983).
52. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 3. See also FCC under
gun on financial interest, BROADCASTING, June 14, 1982, at 31.
No. 31
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commercial television networks, during one broadcast season:
'some 60 series will have been introduced by the networks-
more than twice what used to be the normal number-with
only a handful likely to be renewed for the fall.
53
Before the rules were enacted, the network could license the
program for stipping once a series was aired for approximately
three years. This allowed the network to sell low-cost prints of
the series to many stations in different cities. Syndication
equaled big business, especially for a long running program
with high ratings, i.e., a highly successful program, which could
make a lot of money in a short time period. In 1967, three years
before the rules were enacted, network revenues from domes-
tic and foreign sales of television series were $29.3 million. 4
The syndication market produced total revenues of $600 mil-
lion in 1981, 51 while today it generates $800 million annually.
5 6
The problem with this situation was not that the networks
received a high percentage of the revenues, although the
amount was substantial and always increasing. The networks
usually earned only a percentage of the total earned by the
producer for the syndication rights, and this was a small
amount compared to their advertising revenues. 57 Rather, the
problem was that before the rules were enacted, the networks
controlled the syndication market by warehousing programs.
First, networks would not distribute or license programs to in-
dependent stations after there were a sufficient number of
shows to prepare the series for the syndication market, but in-
stead would wait for a longer period of time, a process known
as warehousing.58 By withholding programs from the market,
the networks were presumably protecting network program-
ming. 9 In addition, by restricting the program supply from the
market, the price of the programming on the market was likely
to ris6.6° By refusing to lease the program to the independent
stations, the networks tried to assure themselves of continued
53. 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 51, at 2-26, 2-27.
54. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 18.
55. FCC opens box on financial interest, BROADCASTING, June 28, 1982, at 30.
56. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 118.
57. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 18.
58. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 145; Burch and Wiley
square off, BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, at 35.
59. Latest champion of repeal.k ABC, BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, at 37.
60. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 146. See supra note 46
and accompanying text for an explanation of the assertion made by some commenta-
tors that the networks would have an incentive to withhold their most popular pro-
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public patronage and higher revenues. Second, networks
would not distribute or license programs to independent sta-
tions for syndication if any programs would be aired to com-
pete with a network program shown on the network affiliate in
that local area.6' Third, networks were more likely to choose to
exhibit a program on their network schedule if they had a fi-
nancial interest in that program. 6 2 This could be used as a bar-
gaining tool with the independent producers, in order to
extract a higher percentage in the program itself. These three
factors gave the networks great control over the success or fail-
ure of a program. For all practical purposes, the three national
networks controlled "the entire network television program
production process from idea through exhibition. 63 The in-
dependent producers fear that repeal of the rules may reestab-
lish this control.
B. Litigation Concerning the Prime Time Access Rule and the
Financial Interest and Syndication Rules
1. Mt. Mansfield
By not defining "public interest," the FCC left open the issue
of how to serve or act within the public interest. In 1971, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Mt. Mansfield Tele-
vision, Inc. v. FCC, held that the PTAR was not arbitrary or
against the public interest as a matter of law. 4 The petitioners
in that case, the three national networks and other affiliated
local stations, attacked the PTAR on several grounds, the first
and foremost being that it was a direct restraint on speech in
violation of the first amendment. 5 They argued that because
the network distributors were barred from distributing their
product for one-half hour, the station licensees had their free-
dom of choice restricted and the viewer was denied access to a
network program he might have preferred to watch.6 6 In re-
jecting this argument, the court considered the peculiar nature
of the broadcast media, that is, there are "substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
grams from syndication in order to deny them to independent stations and thus
damage the independents' competitive position.
61. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 21.
62. Id. at paras. 19-20, 28.
63. Id. at para. 11.
64. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 470.




to allocate."67 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC established
that it is the "right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount."68 Therefore, since the
PTAR is designed to promote diversity in views and program-
ming, the rule will promote the opening up of the media to the
viewing public and thus "enhance rather than abridge the free-
doms of speech and press protected by the First
Amendment."69
The plaintiffs in Mt. Mansfield also attacked the FISR on the
grounds that the Communications Act of 1934 does not give the
FCC explicit authority to regulate network activities.7 ° The
court rejected this argument, citing United States v. Southwest-
ern Cable Co. ,71 in which the Supreme Court determined that
the Commission had been charged with broad responsibili-
ties.72 The FCC has the authority to "generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest,"7 3
and is specifically empowered "to make special regulations ap-
plicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.
74
The Mt. Mansfield court examined the statistics which
demonstrated the increased network domination over evening
program hours and concluded that "access to network affiliated
stations during prime time is virtually impossible for in-
dependent producers of syndicated programs. ' 7 The statistics
showed that "between 1957 and 1968, the share of network eve-
ning program hours either produced or directly controlled by
networks rose from 67.2% to 96.7%.'76 The industry was set up
so that the networks had an advantage because of their estab-
lished relationship with their affiliates. The networks em-
ployed a "permanent unified distribution" process 77 which left
the independent producer at a disadvantage due to the pro-
67. Id.at 477 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
68. Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
69. Id. at 478-79.
70. Id. at 480-81.
71. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968).
72. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 480-81.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i); Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 481. See id. for an explanation of
how both networks and their affiliates are encompassed by the phrase "radio stations
engaged in chain broadcasting." See also supra note 29.
75. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 483.
76. Id. at 482.
77. Id. at 485.
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cess, and not the product.
78
The Mt. Mansfield court found that the FCC was reasonable
in its 1970 findings that: (1) both the financial interest and syn-
dication rules were necessary to restore to the independent
producer those rights which they uniformly were forced to bar-
gain away due to network control of the airwaves, 79 and (2) the
financial interest rule was essential to effectuate the syndica-
tion rule since only together could these rules preclude net-
works from getting an interest and thus controlling the
product.80
The FCC believed that a prohibition on syndication rights in
programs first exhibited by the networks, would "remove the
incentive for networks to choose for exhibition only those
shows in which these [syndication] rights are granted, and
[would] increase the profitability of independent produc-
tion."'" With the FISR in place, the television industry would
no longer see totally independent productions competing
against network-dominated programs for exhibition. The prof-
itability of independent productions would increase with in-
dependent producers able to recoup their losses and even
make a profit off their eventual run in syndication. The total
effect, as predicted by the FCC, would result in "decreasing
network dominance and curbing potential competitive re-
straints, 8 2 i.e., a diverse and competitive television
marketplace.
Southwestern Cable Co. established the test to determine
whether or not the rules promulgated by the FCC are within
the Commission's statutory power, and examined whether the
rules are "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting. ' 83 The court in Mt. Mansfield, apply-
ing this test, held that the "syndication rule is supported by
evidence and is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regu-
lation of television broadcasting.' "84
The court did note that it had a duty to find that the FCC's
78. Id.
79. Id. at 485-86.
80. Id. at 486. See also Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 30.
81. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 486.
82. Id. at 486-87.
83. Id. at 481 (citing Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178).
84. Id. at 487.
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action was based on findings supported by evidence, and not to
say that the public interest would be furthered by such actions.
In other words, the question of what was in the public interest
in the court's view was not answered. It is probably safe to
conclude that if the court believed the Commission's actions
not to be in the public interest, it would have found a way to
hold that the FCC's actions were not reasonably ancillary to its
effective performance. After this case, though, there remains
no clear definition of the public interest in the media.
2. United States v. National Broadcasting Co.
In April 1972, the Department of Justice filed complaints
against the three networks alleging violations of the Sherman
Act.85 In United States v. National Broadcasting Co. ,86 the gov-
ernment contended that National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) had used the power it derived from control over its
owned and affiliated stations to monopolize the production of
prime-time television programming shown on the NBC net-
work.87 In addition, the government alleged that NBC had en-
tered into agreements in restraint of trade, particularly in
purchasing programs produced by independent producers.88
On November 17, 1976, the government and NBC submitted
to the court a proposed final consent judgment, which paral-
leled the "restrictions placed on all three television networks
by the FCC's financial interest and syndication rules."8 9 The
Antitrust Prodedure and Penalties Act 90 established that
before a court can approve such a judgment, "it must determine
that such judgment is in the public interest."'" While there
were many objections from public interest groups, the court
ruled that none of the solutions offered by these groups met
the required standard.92 Rather, the court held that "[t] he gov-
ernment in its role as protector of 'the public interest' appears
to have accomplished an acceptable result,"93 and that the pro-
85. NBC entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice in 1978.
ABC and CBS entered into similar consent decrees in 1980. See Tentative Decision
and Request, supra note 38, at para. 18 n.4.
86. 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
87. Id. at 1130.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1131.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1977 Supp.)
91. United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. at 1129 (emphasis in original).




posed consent decree was in the public interest.9 4
The court noted that the government was attempting to im-
prove the position of the independent producers and suppliers
against the networks and their enormous market power, and to
"enhance competition in the buying and selling of television
programming by imposing on the networks restrictions on the
terms and conditions governing their contracts with the in-
dependent suppliers.9 As such, the remedy sought was to
"limit the benefits and financial rewards that otherwise would
flow from an exercise of [the enormous market] power [of the
networks] ."96 It was this remedy that the court found to be
within the public interest.
C. Cable TV
While the networks were gaining control of the airwaves and
becoming increasingly regulated, technology was simultane-
ously improving and producing several new forms of electronic
communications, namely, cable television, pay television, sat-
ellite transmission, portable video cameras, home video re-
corders and video games, as well as improving those forms of
electronic communications not yet perfected, including the
video disk, fiber optics, electronic data transmission and sev-
eral forms of computer-linked television.97
Cable television was initially developed as a means of pro-
viding better reception than was originally possible with an an-
tenna, because of terrain or distance problems, as well as a
means of providing a variety of program choices, including the
three network services and nonnetwork and educational serv-
ices, to areas too small in population to support a local televi-
sion station.98 In this sense, the networks liked the idea of
cable because it meant more people viewed the network pro-
grams and the networks could consequently charge more for
advertising without incurring the cost of expansion into these
local areas. "In the mid-1960s the FCC began regulating cable
TV because it feared that such systems might begin importing
94. Id. at 1143.
95. Id. at 1145.
96. Id.
97. Brown, Cable and Pay TV on Eve of Technological Revolution, N.Y. Times, July
31, 1978, at C12, col. 1.
98. In re Amendments of Subpart L, Part 91, Subpart I, Part 21, and Parts 21, 74 and
91, Second Report and Order 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para. 47 (1966).
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distant signals (programs from TV stations outside the local
community) to the detriment of local over-the-air TV sta-
tions."99 New regulations were established in 1972 after "an in-
dustry-wide Consensus Agreement [was] negotiated by the
White House and the affected industry interests-broadcast-
ers, cable operators, and program producers (copyright
owners)."100
The FCC's regulations governing broadcast signal carriage
by television systems were basically of four types: (1) "rules
that mandate carriage of particular signals;" (2) "rules that
limit the number of distant television broadcast signals that
may be carried;" (3) "rules that require the deletion of particu-
lar network or syndicated programs from signals that are car-
ried" (i.e., nonduplication and program exclusivity rules); and
(4) "rules that require deletion of particular sports programs
from signals that are carried."10' 1 Finally, in 1980 the Commis-
sion repealed the distant signal carriage and syndicated pro-
gram exclusivity rules."0 2  This action was attacked by
television broadcasting and programming interests in Malrite
T.V. v. FCC and upheld by the Second Circuit in 1981.103 The
court found "that the FCC's action was neither arbitrary nor
capricious"'1 4 since "[a fter considering several econometric
and case studies concerning the impact of cable television on
local station audiences and future cable penetration rates, the
Commission found that the impact on broadcasting stations
99. W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 439 (2d ed. 1978). First Report
and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965), indirectly regulated cable television, and 31 Fed. Reg.
4540 (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76), directly regulated cable television. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 157, established the authority of the FCC to promulgate these
rules.
100. Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1981); Cable Television, Report
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
101. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report and Or-
der, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, para. 10 (1980).
102. Id. at para. 1. 'The distant signal carriage rules generally vary the number of
distant signals that cable systems may carry based on the size of the television market
(35 mile zone) in which a system is located." Id. at para. 11.
The syndicated program exclusivity rules limit .the carriage of individual pro-
grams on signals that are otherwise available for carriage under the distant
signal carriage quotas.... In their application to the fifty largest markets,
they require cable television systems, at the request of local television sta-
tions, to delete all programs from distant signals that are under contract for
television exhibition to local stations.
Id. at para. 14.
103. Malrite TV, 652 F.2d at 1143.
104. Id. at 1147.
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from the deregulation of cable television would be negligible,
and that the consumers would be decidedly better off due to
increased viewing options from the greater availability of ex-
panded cable services."'1  In particular, "the expansion of
cable services was reasonably found not to threaten the basic
nature of free television."'106 The FCC found that their actions
were in the public interest since "elimination of the distant sig-
nal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules will enhance con-
sumers welfare by promoting competition in both the
economic marketplace and the marketplace of ideas." 107 The
Second Circuit agreed that "[i]n shifting its policy toward a
more favorable regulatory climate for the cable industry, the
FCC has chosen a balance of television services that should
increase program diversity, a valid FCC regulatory goal."'0 8
The only regulations that cable systems must continue to ob-
serve today are the mandatory carriage of local television sig-
nals (within a radius determined by the size of the market),
the network nonduplication rules (which forbid showing cur-
rent network programs) and the sports blackout rules (that re-
quire the "black[ing] out [of] local sporting events if the local
broadcast station is also obliged to do so," e.g., "where the
sporting event has not been sold out")."9
Judging from comments made by network executives in 1978,
it would appear that the networks did not become concerned
about the growth of cable until very recently." 0 It is interest-
105. Id. at 1146.
106. Id. at 1150.
107. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, supra note 101, at
para. 330.
108. Malrite TV, 652 F.2d at 1151.
109. Schwartz, Where Cable TV Stands After F.C.C. Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1980, at C26, col. 5.
110. In an article published in the New York Times on July 31, 1978, the networks
contended that the present system of television was not in jeopardy. Brown, supra
note 97, at C12, col. 1. This comment was made in the face of "developments [which]
are leading to primarily ... vast increases in the number of viewing channels avail-
able to viewers and cheaper and more efficient national distribution of programming."
Id. "More channels and cheaper distribution would inevitably mean more networks,
and these may be expected to cut into the audiences for ABC, CBS and NBC, as well
as existing local television stations." Id. The article quotes CBS Broadcasting Group
President, Gene F. Jankowski, as saying "[t]hese new industries ... are small busi-
ness and not a serious threat to us." Id. at col. 6. Alfred Ordover, the executive in
charge of corporate planning at NBC, said, "the expansion of cable to the 30 percent
mark [estimated to reach there between 1981 and 19851 would more seriously affect




ing to note that the extensive changes in their attitudes about
cable's impact came at the same time that the FCC began to
move closer and closer to total deregulation.
D. Reconsideration of PTAR-FISR
In 1977, the FCC's Network Inquiry Special Staff commenced
a study to determine the future of American television net-
works."' In 1978, the FCC issued a Further Notice of In-
quiry . 112 The Network Inquiry Special Staff, recommending
abolition of the PTAR and the FISR, found that "the financial
interest and syndication rules might well be disrupting an effi-
cient risk-sharing arrangement between the networks and
their program suppliers .... With the rules in place, network
fees to producers were reduced, thus forcing the producer to
shoulder a greater financial risk initially.""' 3 The staff con-
cluded that this could result in a greater concentration in the
program production industry because small independent pro-
ducers would be forced to merge with larger more financially
sound producers who could better absorb the risks of unsuc-
cessful series, which had been previously shared with the
networks. 114
While the networks were in favor of repeal of the PTAR,
their affiliates disapproved. The half-hour period they had
gained from the rules was typically devoted to nonnetwork
programming and had become "their most lucrative advertis-
ing period of the entire broadcast day,"115 because the advertis-
ing revenues thereof were not shared with the networks. The
networks realized that they needed their affiliates on their side
and quickly dropped their position favoring repeal of the
PTAR. Interestingly enough, the issue of repeal of the PTAR
was "removed from the [FCC] agenda, and talk of full-scale
repeal has never resurfaced.""' 6 The networks have succeeded
111. In re Commercial Television Network Practices and the Ability of Station
Licensees to Serve the Public Interest, Notice of Inquiry, 62 F.C.C.2d 548 (1977).
112. In re Commercial Television Network Practices, Further Notice of Inquiry, 69
F.C.C.2d 1524 (1978). Reports issued by the Network Inquiry Special Staff appear as:
The Historical Evolution of the Commerical Network Broadcast System Leading to the
Adoption of the Prime Time Access Rule, The Financial Interest Rule and the Syndica-
tion Rule, Dockets 12782 and 19822 (Oct. 1979); and New Television Networks: Entry
Jurisdiction, Ownership and Regulation (Oct. 1980).
113. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 21.
114. Id; see also Waz, supra note 38, at 4.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 5.
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in convincing their affiliates that repeal of the FISR would be
in their best collective interest.
117
E. Current FCC Action
In June, 1981, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making regarding repeal of the FISR. 118 While the FCC never
expressly endorsed or rejected the Network Inquiry Special
Staff's conclusions or recommendations, they "instituted the
... rule making proceedings ... in order to evaluate the spe-
cial staff's conclusions .... [They] asked whether changes in
market conditions over the past decade may have obviated the
need for the financial interest and syndication rules."1 9
The FCC issued a Tentative Decision and Request for Further
Comment on August 12, 1983.120 After a long discussion of the
effects of the rules on the production industry, the television
broadcast stations, advertising costs and the television net-
works, the FCC concluded that "no credible evidence [exists]
that the rules have fostered the development of first-run syndi-
cated programming or have increased the diversity or competi-
tiveness of the program supply market.' 12 1 The FCC
specifically found that there was no justification for the finan-
cial interest rule and issued a tentative ruling to abolish it.
122
"The financial interest rule has failed to increase the independ-
ent program supply, has no effect on program diversity or qual-
ity, has not decreased network control over program content or
creativity, does not represent an inherently undesirable con-
flict, and appears to present no threat to the well-being of the
independents.' 23
A large portion of the proposal's discussion section focused
on the effect of the rules on the syndication market. The con-
cern expressed in a great many comments received by the FCC
was that repeal of the rules "would allow the networks to exer-
117. See CBS-TV affiliates throw support to repeal of financial-interest rules,
BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 48; NBC affiliates line up behind push to repeal syndi-
cation and financial interest, BROADCASTING, Dec. 6, 1982, at 71; Affiliates present united
front, BROADCASTING, Dec. 13, 1982, at 37.
118. Amendment of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest Rule, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959
(1982).
119. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 22.
120. 48 Fed. Reg. 38,020.
121. Id. at para. 195.
122. Id. at para. 196.
123. Id. at para. 201.
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cise control over the availability of off-network programming,
and that television stations, particularly independent stations
in competition with network affiliates, would be affected ad-
versely by such control."'24 Many opponents of repeal believe
the networks would "warehouse," i.e., withhold off-network
programs from the market, if the rules were repealed. 125 If net-
works prevent programs already shown on network television
from going into syndication, many argue that the price of pro-
gramming would go up because of the restricted supply or pro-
gramming on the market, and the size of independent stations'
audiences would be reduced, thereby alleviating the competi-
tion to the networks and their affiliates.
126
The FCC spent a good deal of time discussing the possibility
of networks withholding programs from the syndication mar-
ket and concluded that while it "would generally not be a profit
maximizing course of conduct to follow, it is nevertheless a
matter of sufficient concern to warrant some continued regula-
tory involvement.' ' 27 The FCC proposed a revised syndication
rule applicable only to the three major national networks and
their domestic distribution of prime time entertainment series
to television broadcast stations for nonnetwork television
exhibition.12 8
To reduce any possibility of warehousing, a network will be re-
quired, within six months of a series completing its network
exhibition run, to transfer all rights in that series it may hold
relating to its syndication, to an unaffiliated syndicator. In ad-
dition, no later than the end of the fifth year of a network series
run, the network will have to transfer all syndication rights for
programs in that series to an unaffiliated syndicator.
129
The FCC points out that the term unaffiliated is intended to
separate ownership from control. 30 Therefore, a network affili-
ate could be the syndicator to whom the rights are transferred
because there is no common ownership of the two. 13' In addi-
tion, the FCC will require a network to file a notice with the
FCC within thirty days after each sale or transfer. 32 The net-
124. Id. at para. 145.
125. Id.
126. Id. at para. 146.
127. Id. at para. 202.
128. Id. at para. 203.
129. Id. at para. 204 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at n.99.
131. Id.
132. Id. at para. 204.
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work must certify that such sale or transfer was consistent
with the FCC's rules. 33 This will permit the FCC and the De-
partment of Justice to monitor the networks' sales and possi-
ble anticompetitive practices.3
F. Reaction to the FCC Tentative Decision
The reaction to the FCC's tentative decision was mixed. The
networks and their affiliates were disappointed that no final ac-
tion was taken and that the rules were not totally abolished,
but welcomed the reduction in government regulation of the
television industry as a well justified action.
135
The Committee for Prudent Deregulation (CPD), on the
other hand, found the FCC action totally unacceptable.'3 6
Other opponents of repeal reiterated comments made earlier,
while stronger comments were made indicating that "this will
be the worst disaster for the public interest in ... 20 years"
because the networks would be given "total, complete, fatal
domination of the TV industry to the ultimate injury of the
public."'
137
Some independent stations opposed repeal somewhat less
strongly than other stations because the FCC proposal al-
lowing networks into limited syndication "fixed restrictions
against the warehousing of programs to keep them out of in-
dependents' hands.' 38 Other independent stations remained
skeptical about whether they would still get off-network series
as early as they had since the rules were implemented.
39
Others still did not believe the proposal would provide ade-
quate protection to independent stations and television
viewers.14o
The first-run syndicators feared that it would be "impossible
to sell programs in the top markets where network owned-and-
operated stations would likely be more inclined to pick up pro-
133. Id.
134. Id. at n.101.
135. Networks win financial interest, syndication battle, BROADCASTING, Aug. 8,
1983, at 28-29.
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id.
138. What next on financial interest and network syndication rules?, BROADCAST-
ING, Aug. 22, 1983, at 25.
139. Id. at 26.
140. Rerunning differences of opinion over network syndication and financial inter-
est repeal, BROADCASTING, Sept. 26, 1983, at 48.
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grams produced by their own parent companies."1' In addi-
tion, the networks would probably establish close relationships
with only a few syndicators, resulting in a strategy advanta-
geous to the networks' overall interests.142
This modified syndication rule would only be in effect until
August 4, 1990, when the rule would "sunset," unless the FCC
reached a determination that the public interest warranted
continuation of the syndication rule.
143
Several groups opposed the 1990 "sunset" deadline. Para-
mount Pictures Corporation pointed out that "'[t]he 1990
"sunset" deadline means that networks effectively would con-
trol syndication of all program series produced hereafter since
those programs generally will not be "ripe" for syndication un-
til the end of the decade anyway.' ,14
The remainder of this article discusses the public comments
received by the FCC in the fourteen months between its Notice
of Proposed Rule Making 145 and its tentative decision, as well
as the comments received after its tentative decision was an-
nounced. At the time of this writing, no final decision has been




Television produced in the public interest means diversifica-
tion in programming. Competition in industry generally leads
to an offering of better and more varied products. Increased
competition and diversity in the television industry benefits
the television viewer as a consumer of programs, and the pro-
ducer as a supplier of those programs. Independent producers
and the viewing public are not the only two groups who would
be affected by repeal of the Financial Interest and Syndication
Rules. Fortunately, other groups have expressed their views
on the subject, siding either with the networks for repeal of the
rules, or with the independent producers, for the retention of
141. BROADCASTING, Aug. 22, 1983, supra note 138, at 26.
142. Id.
143. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 209.
144. BROADCASTING, Sept. 26, 1983, supra note 140, at 54.
145. 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959.
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the rules." Both sides claim the result would be increased
competition and diversity in programming, benefitting the pub-
lic interest, and with the result coming about through a differ-
ent process and course of change.
In general, those who favor repeal argue that the networks
must be allowed to obtain syndication rights and financial in-
terests in the programs they exhibit, in order to remain secure
in their financial positions and thereby keep free television a
viable medium.1 47 Those who favor retention of the rules argue
that the "rules have made TV programming more competitive,
and have strengthened independent TV stations, leading to
greater diversity and allowing new programming sources to
flourish.' 48 They believe that repeal of the rules would lead to
the situation that preceded adoption of the rules, i.e., network
domination of the airwaves, as well as all the repercussions
that the FCC specifically intended to prevent by its adoption of
the FISR.
A. The Networks
The networks and their affiliates have several arguments
which lead them to claim that television will only continue to
improve with repeal of the FISR.
1. Programming
(a) Risks
CBS claims that the rules "discourage the networks from
funding 'creative and high-risk programming,' and preclude
the networks from helping small producers to finance new pro-
grams."'149 The networks claim that the prohibition "raises the
cost of programming, reduces total investment in program pro-
duction, and may reduce diversity by encouraging excessive
production of 'tried and true' program types.' ' 50 In addition,
the networks believe that it is unfair to prevent them from
sharing in the rewards of programs which they helped to fi-
nance in the first place.15 1 According to the FCC, because the
146. Syndication, financial-interest comments: high-stake rulemaking, BROADCAST-
ING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 32.
147. Waz, supra note 38, at 5.
148. Id. at 4.
149. BROADCASTING, June 14, 1982, supra note 52, at 31.
150. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 31.
151. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 28.
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rules prohibit networks from participating in sales of syndica-
tion rights, the rules have generated inefficient risk-sharing.
1 5 2
Although this may be true, the networks may be in the best
position to bear the risks involved in producing a new program
due to their national affiliations, expertise in designing pro-
gram schedules and ability to pool the risks of programs across
an entire program schedule. 53
The networks also claim that the fact that a broadcast net-
work cannot share in the syndication profits of programs in
which it invested "'harms free broadcast networks in compet-
ing for programs with the pay media,'" because the pay media
is not subject to these rules. 54 The affiliates join the networks
supporting repeal for this same reason, that is, "the rules hin-
der networks in their effort to obtain top-quality program-
ming"'155 and the affiliates do not "want the networks





The networks argue that cable television and subscription
services "are expanding and enhancing the opportunities for
program suppliers."'57 Many of these pay services "can outbid
the networks for programming that could otherwise be shown
on 'free' [television]. '"1"8 "The American Legal Foundation
contends that this situation eliminates programming options
available to viewers unable to afford pay television. "159
This argument has many facets to it. In general, it is unfair
that the networks are subject to rules to which their competi-
tion are not. The networks are facing increased competition
from the new media, i.e., cable, satellite, etc. In reaction to this
competition, the networks claim "that the rules have been
made obsolete by technological change.' 160 When the rules
were adopted, the FCC believed that the three networks mo-
152. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 133.
153. Id. at para. 134.
154. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 29 (quoting NBC).
155. Financial interest debate gets change of venue-Las Vegas, BROADCASTING,
Mar. 28, 1983, at 60.
156. Id.
157. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 69.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Broadcasting, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 28.
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nopolized the buying market and the rules gave the independ-
ent producers some leverage in selling their programs to the
networks. NBC claims that "[n]o one today could rationally
argue that the traditional broadcast networks are suppliers'
only program purchasers. Now, many substantial purchasers,
including the new pay media buyers unforeseen when the
rules were adopted, compete for all kinds of programs."''
While most of the networks' claims are valid, there are
problems with their reasoning. First of all, the enactment of
the FISR is one of the sole reasons that the networks today are
not the "suppliers' only program purchasers.' 16 According to
the CPD the rules have "contributed to a marketplace struc-
ture in which independent television stations have 'grown dra-
matically in just a decade from relative obscurity to a position
of significant, albeit fragile, prominence as competitors to net-
work-owned and affiliated stations.' ""63 Independent stations
have emerged as buyers competitive with the networks due to
their "ability to obtain reasonable and timely access to recent
and popular off-network program series.'
6 4
Second, the networks have continued to reach a "combined
audience share of as much as 95% at times, even while the new
media competition continues to grow."' 65 Furthermore, "where
the networks occupied 55% of the broadcast day in 1960, they
now occupy 69% of it."'66 In other words, as of yet the new me-
dia has not substantially materialized. The "networks' own
studies reveal that 'pay' [sic] television and other emerging
video technologies will pose no credible threat to the networks'
oligopoly in the television market for many years to come."'
67
Third, networks are free to enter the cable/pay television
market. For example, "NBC's parent company, RCA, has a
hand in everything from satellites to the SelectaVision cas-
161. Id. (quoting NBC).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 30 (quoting the CPD).
164. Id.
165. Id. The networks had a combined 88% share of the audience in 1979, but only
an 81% share in 1981, a loss which the networks claim was due to the new media.
BROADCASTING, June 28, 1982, supra note 55, at 30. See also 1 T. SzLz & M. SIMENSKY,
supra note 51, at 2-29, for statistics evidencing that "the size of the investment required
to license network television programming, and the high risk involved, mean that there
is a low ratio of profits to revenues."
166. Producers, stations bank together to protect PTAR-related rules, BROADCAST-
ING, May 17, 1982, at 41.
167. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 30.
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sette and disc machines."'168 CBS and ABC have entered the
cable market using a joint venture which allows access to large
sums of money from more than one source.1 69 "In this manner,
smaller sums of money can be aggregated . .".'."I" The fact
that many of the co-venturers who enter into the area of new
technologies are "entertainment corporate giants, [may be]
underscoring the extent of the risk which they are unwilling to
bear themselves, even if it means sharing profits later."''
While this may be true, it remains clear that the networks are
attempting to enter an area of broadcasting with the hope of
gaining viewers and making profits. In this sense it appears
that the networks are competing against themselves, while at
the same time complaining that the competition is causing
them to lose viewers and profits.
The networks' arguments tie in to the fact that they are not
making as great a profit now as they were in the past, and they
are concerned about their future. They believe that they have
supported free television from its inception and that injury to
them through loss in audience and profits constitutes injury to
free television. In fact, however, "declines in earnings don't
necessarily mean declines in sales."'72 It should be made clear
to the public that the networks have had "a 550% increase" in
profits from 1970 to 1980. In 1970, $50 million in "profits ac-
counted for 11% of all television profits for the industry," while
in 1980, $325 million "accounted for 20% of the total profits re-
turned.'173 "The networks claim that their composite net share
is declining.' 1 74 They point to emerging new video techniques
168. Brown, supra note 39, at 69.
169. 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 51, at 3-13. See also Brown, Who Killed
CBS Cable?, CHANNELS, Nov./Dec. 1982, at 12, for some of the problems networks face
in entering cable television.
170. 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 51, at 3-12.
171. Id. at 2-31.
172. While CBS's net earnings dropped two percent, its total revenues actually
increased some twelve percent .... Since normal population trends and the
appeal of the new technologies are putting more and more people in front of
television sets, the number of television users is expanding faster than the
decline in network shares. This means that despite the slippage, the actual
number of network viewers is increasing. And, therefore, ad revenues-which
provide the ultimate justification and context for network television-are in-
creasing as well. In 1980 total national televison advertising revenues went up
10.7 percent over 1979.
Brown, supra note 39, at 69.
173. BROADCASTING, May 17, 1982, supra note 166, at 41.
174. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 69.
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as their competition for audience share. 75
(c) Concentration in Supply
CBS contends that the rules have "tended to increase con-
centration in program supply," and therefore the rules have
failed to achieve their objective.'76 The Producers Guild of
America stands by the presentation of the CPD, which ex-
plains that, while there may appear to be fewer suppliers now
than before the rules were enacted, this situation is due to the
decision of independent producers to affiliate themselves with
larger production companies. 77 It would appear that if more
producers, distributors and independent stations have been
able to enter the television industry since the rules were
adopted, the purposes of the rules- increased competition and
diversity in programming-have been fulfilled.7 8 Whether, as
a result of the rules, the affiliation of independent producers
with larger production companies has simply shifted the
wealth from large television broadcast corporations (the net-
works) to large production companies must be more thor-
oughly examined.
The FCC staff in its tentative decision regarding repeal of the
FISR argue that the financial interest rules lead to "inefficient
risk-sharing" because the networks are unable to invest in pro-
grams they distribute, and the producers are left to bear the
risk. 79 The FCC therefore contends that
if larger, established producers are better able, and hence more
willing, to bear risk than smaller or new producers, the current
rules work to the advantage of the larger producers who are
relatively better off and insulated, to some degree, from com-
petitive and new entry. The end result may be a more concen-
trated and less diverse program supply industry. 80
Independent affiliation with larger production companies
may be necessitated by the need for entry level funding, in the
175. Id.
176. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 28.
177. BROADCASTING, June 14, 1982, supra note 52, at 31.
178. "[TJhe number of producers supplying networks with prime time program-
ming increased from 23 in 1970-1971, to 29 in 1981-1982. The number of distributors
increased at an even faster rate, from 122 to 184. And where 10 producers were provid-
ing first-run programming for the half-hour period made available for nonnetwork pro-
gramming by PTAR, in 1971, the number had increased to 42 last year."
BROADCASTING, May 17, 1982, supra note 166, at 41.
179. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 133.
180. Id. at para. 136.
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absence of selling rights to the networks. The production com-
panies may fill the role played by the networks before the en-
actment of the rules by providing financing to the producers in
return for an interest in such programs. However, the position
of large production companies must be distinguished from that
of the large networks. The independent producer may be turn-
ing to the large production company for financing, bargaining
power against the networks, and stability. In return, the pro-
duction company may have a financial interest in many
projects. However, these production companies are not hold-
ing exhibition over the producers' heads as a way to exert crea-
tive control and total financial domination of the program.
While the end result may be a more concentrated program sup-
ply, there is an increased incentive to make innovative pro-
grams, thereby serving the viewing public.
181
2. Warehousing
The independent stations fear that if the FISR are repealed,
the networks would engage in "warehousing," i.e., holding suc-
cessful series off the syndication market to protect network
program schedules. 182 The networks would take this approach
to syndication for two related reasons. First, by preventing
successful series from entering the syndication market, net-
works would be forcing viewers to watch a program series on
the network channel, rather than a rerun of the successful se-
ries shown on an independent station. By withholding these
shows from the independent stations, the networks build up a
larger viewing audience which they are assured of retaining
when the program is syndicated. This allows the networks to
extract a higher price from the distributor or directly from the
independent stations purchasing the syndication rights.
Second, since independent stations generally compete with
network affiliates for non-prime time hours, the hours when
181. It is now possible to have a successful program which is not accepted or dis-
tributed by a network, but which is independently distributed to independent stations
and network affiliates throughout the country.
For example, Operation Prime Time is a group of 93 television stations which
channels the relatively small production dollars available to each into a fund
large enough to undertake the multimillion-dollar financing required to pro-
duce network quality prime time programming, such as 'The Bastard,' a four-
hour television miniseries which cost $3.6 million in 1978.
1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 51, at 3-12.
182. BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, supra note 58, at 35.
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off-network syndicated programs are generally aired, prohibit-
ing independents from showing successful off-network pro-
grams would give affiliates a better chance of getting a greater
audience share than the independent stations. "The independ-
ents' share of audience would decline, bringing them smaller
revenues and forcing them to cut back on the purchase of first-
run programming," thereby alleviating one major form of com-
petition threatening the networks.183 If the FISR are repealed,
the networks could obtain control of syndication rights and
then have the ability and incentive to limit the availability of
programs in syndication, as well as raise their prices.'84 This
action would hurt the independent stations, which make most
of their money from rerunning successful network series.
Proponents of retention of the rules argue that "[f]or in-
dependent stations, the main audience-attracting programs are
recent off-network syndicated shows. The FISR gives in-
dependents assurance that these programs will be available to
them." 8 ' Only recently have these independent stations been
able to put money made from rerunning successful network se-
ries into first-run syndicated programs in direct competition
with the networks. The net result of network control of syndi-
cation, according to the CPD, would be that "[v] iewer access to
popular programs would be diminished, independent station
competitive strength would decrease, and advertisers and con-
sumers of advertised products would pay the price of dimin-
ished competition in the supply of television advertising." 186
After its thorough discussion of the theory behind warehous-
ing,'87 the FCC reached the conclusion that, while withholding
is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out entirely. The FCC pointed to
other forms of programming, such as sports events, movies or
first-run syndicated programming, that are available to the in-
dependent stations as substitutes for off-network program-
ming."'88 These first-run programs, however, may be too
183. Margulies, They're Fighting for High Stakes, EMMY, Mar./Apr. 1983, at 52.
184. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 29 (concern expressed by the
Department of Justice).
185. Opinion, THE TV EXECUTIVE 1983, Vol. 1, No. 2, at XI (stating view of The Asso-
ciation of National Advertisers). See also BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146,
at 30-31, for similar statements by the CPD and the Association of Independent Televi-
sion Stations.
186. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 30.
187. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at paras. 146-74.
188. Id. at para. 153.
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expensive for independent stations to exhibit. The independ-
ents argue that off-network programs cost less than substitutes
because their "production costs have already been recouped
during the network run."'189 Such programs are less risky be-
cause their success can be predicted from the ratings received
by the network during their first run.190 Moreover, longer pro-
grams such as movies and sports events require a time com-
mitment from the audience, which many viewers are often
unwilling to make.191
The FCC found that the evidence submitted defeated the in-
dependents' argument that "for important time periods, other
forms of programming cannot generate net revenues as high
[sic] as those of off-network programs."192 In other words,
since the FCC found that "first-run syndicated programming
can generate revenues similar to those of off-network programs
9193 independent television stations do have close substi-
tutes for off-network programming and would still be able to
survive even if the networks withheld certain programs from
syndication.
194
The FCC agreed with the networks' contention that it would
not make economic sense to warehouse programs for which
syndication rights were paid at fair market value in a competi-
tive market, because "such prices would incorporate all the
revenues the programs would be expected to generate in syn-
dication. Consequently, all the gains from withholding pro-
grams would be lost.
'1 95
The networks continually attack the theory that they would
warehouse programs if the FISR were repealed as lacking eco-
nomic sense. 96 ABC claims that "[s]yndication represents an
important potential source of revenue to a network. Its inter-
ests do not lie in subordinating those revenues; they lie in max-
imizing them.' 97
The networks claim that repeal would not cause them to dis-
criminate against the independent stations in favor of network




193. Id. at para. 155.
194. Id.
195. Id. at para. 157.
196. BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, supra note 58, at 35.
197. BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, supra note 59, at 37 (quoting ABC).
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affiliates, and that they had not done so before the rules were
enacted. In a competitive syndication market, argue the net-
works, such discrimination would be bad business since the in-
dependents are "typically the syndicator's best customer."'
198
The networks do not expect to achieve anything more than
the eighteen percent share of the syndication market that they
had before the rules were adopted. 199 NBC claims it "has no
plans to enter syndication, should the rules be dropped, opting
instead for sale of syndication rights to other companies for a
percentage of profits that [it] estimated might range 'from zero
to 50%-we don't expect to get all of it.' "200
Past history undermines confidence in the sincerity of the
networks' position. The problem of their controlling the syndi-
cation market would not be totally solved even if the networks
received as low a share as five percent of the syndication mar-
ket. Before the FISR were enacted, networks often chose to
exhibit shows in which they had a financial interest, rather
than shows in which they had none.
[S] ave for about 6 or 7 percent of their schedules which were
the result of direct dealing between independent producers
and sponsors, networks accepted virtually no entertainment
program for network exhibition in a 5 year period in which they
did not have financial interests in syndication and other subse-
quent use .... 201
It was partially for this reason that the FCC recognized the
need for both the syndication rule and the financial interest
rule in order to control network domination of the television
industry.
B. The Advertisers
The Association of National Advertisers (ANA), which "rep-
resents some 420 corporations, including all the top 100 adver-
tisers," takes perhaps the most intriguing position.0 2 In
opposing repeal of the FISR, the ANA claims that repeal will
harm independent stations and newer media, "reduce the pub-
lic's viewing options, and make TV advertising less effective,
198. Id.
199. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 28; BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983,
supra note 58, at 35-36.
200. Tinker answers the critics, BROADCASTING, Jan. 17, 1983, at 101 (quoting Ray-
mond Timothy, Group Executive Vice President of NBC).
201. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 19; see also id. at para. 17.
202. THE TV EXECUTIVE, supra note 185, at XI.
No. 3]
COMM/ENT L. J.
less efficient, and more costly. '20 3 The ANA is also concerned
with the continued survival of small advertisers, especially
those with new or improved products or services, who can only
afford to advertise on the local independent stations. This
method of advertising is their only alternative to the expensive
network medium and has only become a viable choice since
the FISR were enacted.2 °4
The advertisers' position must be examined in the context of
the entertainment industry and its historical relationship with
the advertiser.
Formerly, most programming was individually or dually spon-
sored. Individual and dual (or alternate) sponsors frequently
procured their own programs and placed them in time ar-
ranged for on the network through their advertising agencies.
Occasionally an advertiser would indicate his wish to acquire
an individual half hour program and suggest to the network
that it buy the program and obtain an alternate sponsor. Typi-
cal situations involved programs put on by sellers of multiple
brands such as Procter & Gamble, General Foods, and Lever
Brothers. In such cases, the sponsor procured the program di-
rectly from an independent producer and used it to advertise
his various products.
20 5
However, the inflationary effects on the television industry
have been so great that advertisers eventually could not run
the risk of sponsoring an entire show.
Ultimately, this kind of sponsorship was supplemented by min-
ute participations in network-controlled shows, and more re-
cently [late 1960's] by 30-second participations. Under this
method of selling advertising, the network procures a filmed
program, often of an hour or 90 minutes in length, slots it into
its evening schedule and then sells advertising spots to a vari-
ety of sponsors.20 6
The networks receive large sums of money from advertising
revenues. 20 7 It is hard to understand their cries of financial dif-
ficulties when the profits on the combined networks rose from
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 14.
206. Id.
207. Expenditures for television advertising in 1983 are expected to reach $15.8
billion, 12 per cent above 1982. Spending on TV advertising represents approx-
imately 21 per cent [of the] spending for all advertising media. Network ad-
vertising is projected to increase about 12 per cent over 1982, to an estimated
$7.1 billion. This would constitute 45 per cent of all TV advertising. Spot tele-
vision advertising is expected to rise about 13 per cent in 1983, to $4.7 billion,
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$50.1 million in 1970 to $325.6 million in 1980-the decade of the
FISR. °8 It is the advertisers who actually support free televi-
sion. By claiming that repeal would be bad for free television,
the advertisers are actually speaking against the forerunners
of the industry they so strongly support. The fact is that the
advertisers are supporting the independent stations in order to
assure a larger representation of advertisers on television. The
local station may offer specifically what the new and local ad-
vertisers need and desire-an audience that can be targeted to
use their goods and services at a more affordable price. In-
dependent stations will offer a lower price than networks be-
cause of the small viewing audience. "In those markets with
high levels of viewing of independent stations, the [amount]
paid by typical advertisers ranged from 20 percent to 60 per-
cent lower than in markets with little or no independent-sta-
tion viewing.
20 9
While the ANA believes that the growth and development of
advertiser-supported cable will add competition and help ad-
vertisers, it does not foresee this growth occurring in the near
future. The ANA recommended that "the FCC keep its finan-
cial interest and syndication rules until 'such time as the tele-
vision advertising market is genuinely competitive.' "210 The
American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) "rec-
ommended that the FCC monitor the video marketplace," and
consider when such time has arisen.21'
The current economic argument made by the ANA is that
without the rules, the networks would demand from independ-
ent producers an ownership share of the profit in their pro-
grams in exchange for network exposure.212 The independent
producers would then demand a higher price for the original
network showing. The networks would pass this extra pro-
gram expense on to the advertisers; "[w]ith less competition
and higher program costs, the price of TV advertising would
representing about 30 percent of the total. Local television advertising should
rise 11 percent for the year to $4 billion, and account for 25 per cent of the total.
Nyhen, Forecaster Calls TV Ad Growth Stable, THE TV EXECUTIVE, supra note 185, at
xii.
208. Margulies, supra note 183, at 50.
209. THE TV EXECUTIVE, supra note 185, at XI.
210. Latest foe of repeal: ANA, BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, at 36.
211. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 31.
212. THE TV EXECUTIVE, supra note 185, at XI.
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increase.213 This scenario would have two effects: (1) televi-
sion use would be cost-prohibitive for small advertisers, and
(2) larger advertisers continuing to advertise on television
would pass the higher prices paid to the networks on to the
consumers.
214
The advertisers argue that by keeping "independent TV sta-
tions viable as an alternative to increasingly expensive net-
"1215work time, more advertisers can convey their messages.
This enables the consumer to make more efficient buys and
"eventually leads to lower prices at the supermarket and de-
partment store."2 6 The advertisers' position also appears to be
in the "public interest" since their arguments in support of
smaller advertisers will ultimately benefit the consumer. "[I]t
is the consumers' interest, not the question of who owns or
syndicates what, that should carry the most weight in this con-
troversy.'217 Since we are all consumers at one time or an-
other, the position of the consumer may best represent that of
the public interest.
C. The Public Interest
The courts have never defined what is meant by the phrase
"public interest." While the general goals of the rules have
been stated to be increased competition and diversity in pro-
gramming,218 no method has been approved as the best way to
accomplish such goals in the public interest. Since the FISR
are aimed at breaking up the control of the three networks over
the airwaves, it would seem that the public interest would en-
compass the interest of those independent producers who have
been stifled in their competition with the three networks.
However, the "public interest" ordinarily indicates the public
itself-the viewers-and not those producing materials and/or
services for the public. The viewers are the persons who would
benefit by increased diversity in programming.
Both opponents and proponents of repeal claim their posi-
tion will better serve the public interest. The networks claim
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Viewpoint-Maintain Syndication Rules to Keep Competition Alive, ELEC-
TRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 17, 1983, at 8.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See generally Report and Order, supra note 3, at paras. 30, 37; Tentative Deci-
sion and Request, supra note 38, at para. 101.
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that repeal will harm free television. This claim has attracted
some public interest groups to the side of repeal, perhaps with-
out understanding the reasons behind this view. The networks
and their affiliates contend that free television "serves" the
public interest by providing diversity, competition to pay serv-
ices, public affairs programming, and greater opportunities for
minority actors and producers.219 In contrast is the comment
received by the FCC from the National Association of Black
Owned Broadcasters who claim that "repeal would grant inor-
dinate control to the networks and decrease any chance for the
development of specific programs that appeal to minority
audiences.
220
The current marketplace has grown dramatically in ten
years because of three rules which were adopted for that pur-
pose. The rules were also adopted to control the growth of
three corporations which sustained enormous benefits for
thirty years while dominating the television industry. Each
network seems to have painted its own picture of what televi-
sion programming would look like without the FISR. However,
it should be the facts that exist now, as a result of the adoption
of the rules, that are important in deciding whether or not re-
peal is in the public interest. Metromedia Inc., an independent
station in New York, points out that the facts indicate that the
rules reduced its own financial involvement in network pro-
gramming, increased the supply of syndicated programming
and the number of syndicators, increased the number of in-
dependent stations and audience shares of such stations, and
reduced television advertising costs.
221
The facts presented in this article indicate that the FISR
have increased competition in the market place and diversity
in programming such that the public interest has been and is
continuing to be served.222 If competition, program diversity
and the public interest truly were the goals of the FCC in its
institution of the rules, then the rules should not be repealed.
Another rationale behind the adoption of the rules was a
hope for the improvement of free television. "The rules have
provided the only check on the dominant position of the three
219. Tentative Decision and Request, supra note 38, at para. 69.
220. Id. at para. 40.
221. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 30-31.
222. See supra note 178.
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major networks in the television program market. ' 223 The net-
works are now being forced to review their own positions in
the industry in order to compete for the viewing audience,
whereas ten years ago, such viewing attraction was taken for
granted. There has been an increase in the quality and variety
of programming, as well as an increase in the number of view-
ing options. 224 Independent production companies point to the
fact that "[w]ithout the ability to recover its investment and
make a reasonable profit, there would be no motivation for...
any... production company to create and produce unique' and
expensive series such as Hill Street Blues and St.
Elsewhere .225
The Inter-Guild Council of the Talent Guilds of the Motion
Picture and Television Industry, which represents writers, ac-
tors, producers and directors, also opposes repeal of the FISR,
for reasons that perhaps lie behind the successful growth of
the entire industry. "Freedom of expression and the climate
that nurtures creativity and diversity in program content re-
quires [sic] diversity of producers and less restraint on crea-
tive talent. '226  Rather than producing homogeneous
collaborations for the networks which previously held the
purse strings over their projects, producers now have some
creative freedom to explore new topics in new ways and serve
the viewing public. Producers can now create programs with-
out the pressure of needing network approval to insure public
viewing.
The FISR have thus opened up an industry to the persons
who create the programs viewed on television, thereby re-
turning to those persons the creative and financial control they
deserve. In this respect, the 1970 FISR can be analogized to the
Copyright Act of 1976.227 While the Copyright Act of 1909 al-
lowed an author's family or estate to recapture the author's
publication rights given away to the publisher only if the au-
thor died, the Copyright Act of 1976 permits the automatic re-
capture of these rights. 228 The author gave away publication
rights to the publisher for the same reasons that an independ-
223. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 31 (quoting a Paramount Pic-
tures Corporation spokesperson).
224. Id. at 31-32.
225. Id. at 32.
226. Id.
227. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
228. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203-204.
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ent producer gave away syndication and other substantial
rights in a program-because the author was unknown, had no
money and needed the exposure offered by the publisher in
order to become known and to make money. Thus, when the
author became successful because of a creation, the publisher
reaped tremendous benefit from merely doing its job, albeit
well, while the author received a one-time payment for publi-
cation rights. Like the Copyright Act of 1976, the FISR recog-
nized that along with a need for increased competition and
diversity in programming, there was a need to give more credit,
in financial terms, to the deserving party-the producer.
When ABC argues that "repeal would foster competition in
program supply (by permitting the networks to deal with pro-
ducers who need or desire to exchange syndication rights and
interests for greater license fees)," '229 the network is speaking
for the interests of the network and network-dominated televi-
sion. Competition has grown in other ways; more people and
more companies have grown and benefitted by the creation of
the FISR. These rules divested the networks of the creative
and financial control which were owed to the producers. The
working public and the viewing public have benefitted from
competition in the marketplace and diversity in programming,
while the networks have made huge profits, thereby prompting
no other result than the benefit of free television. In the sense
that free television is synonymous with the "public interest,"
then, the FCC has satisfied its Congressional mandate to act
according to the "public convenience, interest and
necessity.
'230
Before the FCC proposed its modified syndication rule, op-
ponents of repeal argued that the idea of retaining the syndica-
tion rule without the financial interest rule would not remedy
the situation, because "[tihe networks ... would have the in-
centive and the opportunity to raise the price of [off-network
syndicated] programming . . . by persuading their affiliates
and O&O's [owned and operated local stations] to bid up the
prices of the programming ....
In 1970 the FCC took a similar position in its determination
229. BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, supra note 58, at 37.
230. 47 U.S.C. § 303.
231. AEI conference revisits FCC oral arguments on financial rules, BROADCASTING,




that the financial interest rule was essential to effectuate the
syndication rule232 in that only together could these rules pre-
clude networks from getting an interest and thus controlling
the product.233 Currently, the FCC has changed its position
and has issued a tentative decision to modify the rules.
D. The Government
1. Department of Justice Backs Down from Its Antitrust
Action Against the Networks
The Department of Justice, which originally favored repeal,
later suggested "that the FCC consider adopting a 'narrow'
rule to address the 'potential harm' the networks could do to
the off-network syndication markets by withholding, or ware-
housing, programming. ' 234 The FCC's proposed syndication
rule was modeled after the recommendations of the Depart-
ment of Justice,23 but even if the FCC adopts its tentative pro-
posal as final action, the networks will still have to abide by the
consent decrees entered into by the Department of Justice and
the three national networks which duplicate the FISR. In or-
der to allow the networks to go into the syndication business
and acquire financial interests in programs produced by in-
dependent producers, as the FCC has proposed, the consent
decrees would have to be modified or eliminated.236 It now ap-
pears that the Department of Justice may be willing to amend
the consent decrees to "permit the networks to produce them-
selves more programming than they are allowed to produce at
present, '237 and thereby acquire a financial interest in the pro-
gramming they broadcast because they produce the program-
ming themselves. Any such change would have to be approved
by the Federal District Court in Los Angeles.
238
2. Hollywood Lobbies Congress
Many comments received by the FCC before its tentative de-
232. Report and Order, supra note 3, at para. 30. This position was also found rea-
sonable in Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 486.
233. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 486. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24, for a
further discussion of this position.
234. Taking the pulse on financial interest, BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1983, at 37.
235. BROADCASTING, Aug. 8, 1983, supra note 135, at 27.
236. United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127. See supra notes 86-96 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of this case and its outcome.
237. ENTERTAINMENT L. REP., July 1983, at 19.
238. Id.; see also BROADCASTING, Aug. 8, 1983, supra note 135, at 30.
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cision was published suggested that discussion of the FISR re-
peal was premature. Those who oppose repeal would prefer
the rules to be attacked at a time when cable and other new
technologies pose a more viable challenge to the free television
industry. Congress' reaction to the FCC debate is an impor-
tant consideration here. An extensive discussion of the dereg-
ulation in radio broadcasting notes that "[a]lthough the
commission can allow some relaxation of rules and guidelines,
legislation is required to keep the courts from overturning FCC
decisions or to prevent future commissions from reimposing
the regulations." '239
Interest in the FCC debate spread to the Congress when
Representative Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) "introduced a bill
(H.R. 2250) that would prohibit any change in those [financial
interest and syndication] rules or in the commission's accom-
panying prime time access rule for five years.'"240
Representative Tim Wirth (D-Colo.), Chairman of the Tele-
communications Subcommittee and one of the bill's sponsors,
is against deregulation for the sake of deregulation.241 "We
must only deregulate when it is warranted by the level of com-
petition-and the level of competition in the video marketplace
simply does not justify lifting those rules which were carefully
designed to protect the public interest from the lack of compe-
tition now facing the networks. ' '2 ' As an objective voice, Rep-
resentative Wirth's statement carries great weight. Congress
will continually be up against the strong broadcast lobby, and
"[i] n part, it is precisely because the broadcasting industry is
so powerful that politicians don't want to lose control over
it., 243
H.R. 2250 eventually passed the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee.244 The subcommittee also passed an amend-
239. Friedman, Should Broadcasters Mind Their Own Business?, AMERICAN FILM,
May 1982, at 56.




243. Friedman, supra note 239, at 59.
244. Hollywood's short-lived win on fin-syn, BROADCASTING, Sept. 26, 1983, at 28.
H.R. 2250 must pass the Energy and Commerce Committee where approximately 21 of
the 42 members are co-sponsors of the bill. Id. at 29. The House Appropriations Com-
mittee was prevented from going forward with an amendment (approved by a 26-to-25
vote) "that would prohibit the FCC from spending any funds for one year to repeal its
financial interest and domestic syndication rules." Id. at 28. The amendment had been
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ment "that would void any action by the FCC after August 1
[19831 and before enactment of H.R. 2250 if it is inconsistent
with H.R. 2250. ' '245
In August 1983, Senator Pete Wilson (R-Calif.) introduced S.
1707, the Competition in Television Production Act, a bill which
mirrors the House Legislation.246 It has been referred to the
Senate Commerce Committee, where there is little support for
the bill because the Chairman is unwilling to address the issue
until the FCC has completed the proceeding.247
At the time of this writing, FCC Chairman Fowler has said
that he would not attempt to alter the rules until after 1984.248
Members of Congress are still concerned that "the FCC [could
act] on the rules in early 1985, while the new session of Con-
gress will be getting organized and won't be in a position to
block the FCC's action. 249 Senator Wilson is currently at-
tempting to delay change of the rules by reviewing his effort to
attach a five-year moratorium on the rules to a pending bill.25 °
3. The President Gets Involved with the FISR
At a meeting on September 28, 1983, FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler briefed President Reagan and White House staff mem-
bers on the extremely controversial FISR.251 The meeting
brought speculation from members of the motion picture in-
dustry as well as network executives because Fowler had
never briefed the President before, and more importantly, be-
cause it is well known that "the President maintains close ties
with members of the motion picture industry who have de-
nounced the commission's tentative proposal to liberalize the
rules .... 252
offered "to give Congress more time to address the issue." Id. Appropriations Com-
mittee members opposed the amendment, arguing that Congress should not interfere
with the FCC's judgment. Id.
245. Id. at 29.
246. FCC set to make its move on financial interest, BROADCASTING, Aug. 1, 1983, at
19.
247. Congress: battlefield for financial interest, syndication, BROADCASTING, Sept.
12, 1983, at 42-43.
248. Leddy, Fowler, senator discuss rule stance, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, May 17, 1984, at
1.
249. Id. at 1, 27.
250. Id. at 27.
251. Leddy, Financial interest fight heats up as Reagan steps in, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Nov. 10, 1983, at 1, 23.
252. Networks nervous over Reagan briefing from FCC's Fowler, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 10, 1983, at 42.
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President Reagan later called in "pro-network administra-
tion officials," Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge and
the United States Justice Department's antitrust chief William
Baxter, to give the argument in favor of immediate total repeal
of the FISR.253 A presidential aide gave the Hollywood argu-
ment "that the networks are still too powerful to be freed from
restrictions.
'25 4
President Reagan made public his pro-studio position in a
letter read during a Senate Commerce Committee hearing on
November 2, 1983.255 The President called for a two-year mora-
torium on changing the FISR.256 According to the President's
letter, he is seeking "time to 'allow [Congress] to give the issue
further study and monitor future changes in the marketplace,
while at the same time ensuring continuing healthy competi-
tion within the industry.' ",257 Shortly thereafter, both the De-
partment of Justice and the Department of Commerce changed
their positions regarding the FISR to ones in favor of the ad-
ministration position.258
The presidential announcement came the day before mem-
bers of the film industry and independent station representa-
tives met with network officials to work out a compromise
regarding the FISR.259 Some members of Congress urged
these negotiations because they themselves are reluctant to be
involved in this "industry feud. ' 2 60  As expected, both sides
proposed very different limitations on networks' financial in-
terest in and syndication of independently produced programs
distributed by the networks.26'
253. Gordon, Reagan digs deeper into syndication, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 27, 1983,
at 3.
254. Id. The President disclosed that to avoid any charges of a conflict-of-interest,
he is "donating any residual payments from his 52 movies to charity;" however the
amount of the payment is "currently less than $1,000 a year." Id. at 21.
255. Leddy, supra note 251, at 23.
256. Id. at 1.
257. Id. at 23.
258. Id. at 1.
259. Id. at 23.
260. Id.
261. Id. The networks agreed to limiting their ownership to 49% of television pro-
grams "in exchange for the right to syndicate anything except prime time programs."
Id. The studios were receptive to the proposal of allowing the networks to bargain for
program ownership, "but insisted that producers, in exchange for sharing ownership
with the networks, be given comparable shares of network advertising revenue gener-
ated by their shows." Id. In addition, the networks offered to support the restrictions
on syndicating prime time programs until 1992, two years later than the FCC's tenta-
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The negotiations between the parties eventually stalled and
"ABC and NBC told top congressional leaders Jan[uary] 23
[1984] that they are backing off their current push to ease the
regulations"-ABC until the end of 1984, and NBC for a reason-
able period of time.262 These two networks blame "the
Hollywood side for causing a stalemate in the negotiations by
bargaining in bad faith. 263 CBS's efforts to negotiate with the
studios failed in mid-February because the "two sides were un-
able to agree on a definition of 'financial interest.' "264
"[W] ith pressure from the White House and additional heat
from Congress, the FCC eventually backed off of its plan to
ease the restrictions and agreed to give Hollywood and net-
work negotiators a chance to develop a compromise set of
rules. '265 After all negotiations failed, Chairman Fowler indi-
cated that "he will press ahead with his drive to relax the
FCC's financial interest and network syndication rules... "
after the FCC sees how Congress reacts to the breakdown in
negotiations.266 Although everyone is waiting for Congress to
act, it is possible that the House and Senate will not address
the issue because of its tight timetable during an election year
session.267 The fact remains, though, that "Congress has legis-
lation in hand that would prevent the FCC from easing the
rules, and it previously was prepared to enact it."
266
Meanwhile, "[a] House oversight subcommittee ... accused
President Reagan of acting improperly by calling Mark Fowler,
Federal Communications Commission chairman, to the White
House last September [1983] to privately discuss the financial
interest and network syndication rules."26 9 The February 3,
1984 subcommittee report concluded that President Reagan
"'undermined the fairness and integrity of the rule-making
tive proposal. Id. The studios and independent station representatives responded by
stating that they would agree to "allowing the networks to syndicate only one type of
show-educational programs." Id.
262. Leddy, Two networks sound retreat on syndication, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Jan. 26,
1984, at 1.
263. Id.
264. Leddy, Fowler plans renewed rules drive at FCC, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 23,
1984, at 3, 21.
265. Leddy, Reagan-Fowler talk improper: House panel, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 9,
1984, at 112.
266. Leddy, supra note 264, at 3.
267. Id. at 21.
268. Id.
269. Leddy, supra note 265, at 1.
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proceeding"' by privately involving himself in the affairs of the
FCC, an independent agency.270 Instead, the Reagan-Fowler
conversation should have been recorded on the public record
"in accordance with FCC rules regarding ex parte discussions
about pending rule makings. '2 71 Fowler insisted that there was
no impropriety in not placing his conversation with the Presi-
dent on public record because "'it was a straight briefing to the
President on this issue [FISR] and other communications mat-




History shows that networks have controlled the television
airwaves since the inception of television. The three major
networks continued their growth, even in the face of court deci-
sions and FCC rules designed to limit network control and in-
crease network competition. The FISR have played an
important and necessary part in the expansion of participation
and competition in the television industry. While the networks
would prefer the situation to be as it was in the beginning-
with no competition, a secured viewing audience, and easy
money in the bank-that situation is no longer an option.
Competition to network television exists; independent stations
can now sustain themselves as viable alternatives for the view-
ing public by providing the diversity that is so much needed in
television programming.
For the first time in television's almost forty-year history, in-
dependent producers are able to work with the creative control
they deserve and need. The financial control that the in-
dependent producers now have assures both the independent
producers and independent stations of their survival. In turn,
the success of the independent stations assures the ability of
small or new advertisers to thrive in the most effective adver-
tising device available-television. Ultimately, the success of
the advertiser assures the consumer of more efficient and eco-
nomical purchasing.
This scenario closely resembles the situation considered by
270. Id.




the public interest mandate under which the FCC operates.
While cases and statutes refuse to define what the "public in-
terest" is, it seems clear that the present situation will benefit
independent producers and consumers more than it will bene-
fit the three huge corporations. As the National Association of
Independent Television Producers and Distributors notes, the
"rules 'remain necessary to the development of any program
marketplace which is self-regulatory by means of competition
through diversity rather than oligopoly.' "273 History shows
that if these three huge corporations gain any control at all by
repeal of the FISR, they will be able to gain strength and move
forward to control again the entire broadcast industry. The
current healthy television marketplace, which the FISR estab-
lished, speaks for itself in the name of increased competition
and diversity in programming. These two goals continue to
benefit the "public convenience, interest or necessity" '274 and
greatly "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio
[and television] in the public interest."
275
If the FCC's tentative decision is finalized, the question will
remain whether the FCC has acted and continues to act within
the "public interest" pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section 303.276 In
making this determination, the FCC will be closely watched by
all those who favor retention of the FISR. In addition, the pub-
lic will continue to watch television with the hope of a broader
choice of programming. The networks claim that repeal will
lead to diversity in the marketplace. The question will be
whether there will continue to be competition in the market-
place which will further diversity and help monitor the actions
of the networks in the marketplace. It is hoped that the public
interest will remain a force behind a healthy and competitive
market.
273. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, supra note 146, at 32.
274. 47 U.S.C. § 303.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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